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Weight stereotyping is the relative devaluation of an overweight body size 
(Sigelman, Miller, & Whitworth, 1986), which has been detected as early as 3 years of 
age (Cramer & Steinwert, 1998).  Previous studies of weight stereotypes have not been 
informed by what we know about children’s social reasoning processes (i.e., positivity 
and negativity biases), essentialist beliefs about weight (i.e., contagiousness, biological 
origins, stability, and changeability) or concurrently developing cognitive and social 
abilities (i.e., cognitive flexibility, theory of mind, and working memory).  The current 
study examined weight stereotypes in 80 3- to 6-year-old children using a story-
distracter-recall paradigm.  Results indicate that with age, children are more accurate in 
labeling positive traits.  Essentialist weight reasoning was not consistent across domains, 
but generally increased with age (from 6.15 to 8.7 on a 14-point scale).  Cognitive 
abilities were related to weight essentialism; notably, increases in cognitive flexibility 
and working memory were associated with decreases in weight stability beliefs for older 
children.  Implications for the role of weight stereotypes in behaviors (i.e., 
discrimination) and the formation of stereotype interventions are discussed.  
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
According to Allport (1954), a stereotype is “an exaggerated belief associated 
with a category.  Its function is to justify (rationalize) our conduct in relation to that 
category” (p. 191).  Stereotypes can be associated with any person or group attribute 
including gender, physical appearance, race, and ethnicity (Bigler & Liben, 2007).  There 
has been considerable research on children’s stereotypes about gender (Banse, 
Gawronski, Rebetez, Gutt, & Morton, 2010; Signorella, Bigler, & Liben, 1993; Trautner 
et al., 2005), physical handicaps (Richardson, 1970; Richardson, Goodman, Hastorf, & 
Dornbusch, 1961; Sigelman et al., 1986), physical attractiveness (Griffin & Langlois, 
2006; Langlois & Stephan, 1977; Langlois et al., 2000), race and ethnicity (Aboud, 1988; 
Augoustinos & Rosewarne, 2001; Chiesi & Primi, 2007; Sigelman & Singelton, 1986), 
yet less is known about children’s weight-based stereotypes.  
The personality reasoning literature suggests that children’s early categorical 
perceptions of others’ personalities may contribute to the formation and development of 
stereotypes, including stereotypes of social categories (e.g., weight).  This thesis will 
begin with a review of literature on stereotyping and personality attribution, followed by 
a discussion of their implications for how children may engage in weight stereotyping.  A  
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study was conducted that examined children’s processing of personality information (i.e., 
agreeability) in relation to weight information (i.e., average weight or overweight).  
Results will be presented, as well as a discussion of their implications for childhood 
weight stereotyping and discrimination. 
Weight stereotyping is the relative devaluation of an overweight body size 
(Sigelman et al., 1986), or the belief that overweight people are different from others in 
terms of personality or behavior (Cramer & Steinwert, 1998; Klaczynski, Daniel, & 
Keller, 2009).  Crandall (1994) asserts that the obese are more negatively stigmatized 
than any other social group or category.  Further, recent research indicates that the 
number of overweight and obese children in the United States has almost tripled in the 
last 30 years (CDC, 2004) and weight stereotyping has strengthened over the last 40 
years (Latner & Stunkard, 2003).  Given its general negative perception, increasing 
prevalence, and links to stereotyping, weight should be studied as it relates to children’s 
conceptions of others. 
Children as young as 3 years of age have exhibited weight stereotyping by 
labeling overweight children as mean and undesirable as playmates (Cramer & Steinwert, 
1998).  Some investigations have found a stigma present throughout childhood, but with 
a gradual decline in preadolescence (Powlishta, Serbin, Doyle, & White, 1994; Stager & 
Burke, 1982); however, other investigations have found increases with age into 
preadolescence (Brylinsky & Moore, 1994; Richardson, 1970).  Practically, it is 
important to study early weight stereotyping as insights into the processes involved may 
have implications for creating intervention programs that could reduce or prevent 
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continued obesity after childhood (Brownell, Schwartz, Puhl, Henderson, & Harris, 
2009).  These programs may help to counteract the potential negative influences of being 
young and overweight on psychological, emotional, and social development 
(McClanahan, Huff, & Omar, 2008) by altering the control attributions (i.e., blaming the 
person) that those who stereotype associate with being overweight (Anesbury & 
Tiggeman, 2000; Bell & Morgan, 2000; Crandall, 1994; Musher-Eizenman, Holub, 
Barnhart, Miller, Goldstein, & Edwards-Leeper, 2004; Puhl & Latner, 2007; Sigelman & 
Begley, 1987; Tiggemann & Anesbury, 2000).  
Theoretically, little is known about the mechanisms that drive stereotyping and 
weight reasoning in early childhood, namely, the extent to which children may 
overgeneralize appearance-based or personality-based traits across domains (e.g., what 
influence knowledge of a target’s appearance may have on a person’s recall of the 
target’s personality or vice versa).  Given that stereotypes about weight are most often 
negative and tied to personality factors, understanding how children reason about others 
when provided with both weight and personality information will aid the process of 
understanding stereotyping by determining which domain (i.e., appearance or 
personality) is more salient to children when reasoning about others. 
Stereotype Development 
Categorization, the act of labeling or organizing others into groups, is thought to 
be a precursor to stereotyping (Bigler & Liben, 2007).  Children can categorize other 
people into groups quite early, although it depends on the category in question (Macrae, 
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Stangor, & Hewstone, 1996).  Gender appears to be a primary dimension for 
categorization, with children as young as 7 months able to differentiate between male and 
female voices (Miller, 1983).  Preschoolers are also able to classify others by ethnicity 
(Aboud, 1988), body type (Lerner, 1973), and age (Edwards, 1984).  By middle 
childhood, children appear to categorize by salient factors also attaching meaningful 
beliefs (i.e., stereotypes), affect (i.e., prejudice), and behaviors (i.e., discrimination) to 
these categories similarly to adults (Bigler & Liben, 2007).  Although patterns of 
stereotyping appear to be similar in preschoolers and elementary-aged youth, younger 
children are often more rigid in their beliefs (Penny & Haddock, 2007a), while older 
children exhibit more flexible thinking (Banse et al., 2010; Powlishta et al., 1994; 
Trautner et al., 2005) and social desirability (Augoustinos & Rosewarne, 2001), which 
may reduce the prevalence of explicit stereotyping. 
Although weight stereotypes have not been widely studied in young children, 
relevant information from other domains of stereotyping provides a context for general 
stereotype development during this period.  In terms of children’s knowledge of 
stereotypes, there is a progression such that stereotypes are apparent by preschool, at 
ceiling during elementary school, and then may become seemingly more flexible into 
early adolescence. 
By 3 years of age, children display knowledge of gender stereotypes by 
organizing photos by gender, identifying their own gender, and using same-sex gender 
labels to guide their behavior (Thompson, 1975).  By 4 years of age, children exhibit 
5 
 
physical handicap stereotypes manifested as negative beliefs and expectations associated 
with those who deviate from the norm such as a person in a wheel chair or with a facial 
deformity (Sigelman et al., 1986).  Also at 4 years of age, children display ethnic or racial 
stereotypes as predisposed reactions toward others based on their ethnic or racial 
membership (Aboud, 1988; 2003).  Finally, at 5 years of age, children display physical 
attractiveness stereotypes manifested as negative beliefs and expectations associated with 
unattractive people (Griffin & Langlois, 2006; Langlois et al., 2000).  
During the elementary years (i.e., 5 to 8 years of age), gender stereotype 
knowledge reaches a ceiling (Banse et al., 2010; Signorella et al., 1993; Trautner et al., 
2005), and negativity towards physical handicaps strengthens (Richardson, 1970; 
Sigelman et al., 1986).  Physical attractiveness stereotypes (Langlois & Stephan, 1977) 
and ethnic stereotypes (Aboud, 2003) also become more consistent during this period.  
Stereotypes then become more flexible with gender (Banse et al., 2010; Trautner et al., 
2005) ethnic (Augoustinos & Rosewarne, 2001; Powlishta et al., 1994), and physical 
handicap (Richardson et al., 1961) stereotype flexibility increasing until about 9 to 11 
years of age. However, physical handicap flexibility may vary by domain (i.e., physical 
or cosmetic handicap, see Richardson, 1970; Sigelman et al., 1986), while gender 
(Powlishta et al., 1994) and physical handicap stereotypes show different patterns 
depending on the gender of the participant (Richardson, 1970; Sigelman et al., 1986). 
In sum, young children have stereotype knowledge as early as age 3, with gender 
stereotypes appearing the earliest and physical attractiveness stereotypes appearing the 
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latest in development.  Children exhibit rigid beliefs associated with social categories 
until reaching a plateau in stereotype knowledge around 6 years of age; however, 
between about 7 and 11 years of age, children exhibit increasing flexibility and social 
desirability regarding their social stereotypes.  Although the developmental trends for 
general stereotyping seem to follow a similar pattern, bias in one domain (e.g., gender) is 
not necessarily predictive of bias in another domain (e.g., ethnicity; Powlishta et al., 
1994). 
Weight Stereotypes  
Physical appearance functions as a salient, visible dimension that influences 
children’s categorizations and impressions of others (Langlois & Stephan, 1977), and 
weight is a component of physical appearance.  Weight stereotypes can manifest as 
negative perceptions of overweight individuals, positive perceptions of average weight or 
thin individuals, or both (Cramer & Steinwert, 1998).  Cross-sectional research indicates 
that weight stereotypes are present from 3 years of age (Cramer & Steinwert, 1998; 
Margulies, Floyd, & Hojnoski, 2008), and have been documented during childhood (Hill 
& Silver, 1995; Tiggemann & Anesbury, 2000; Tillman, Kehle, Bray, Chafouleas, & 
Grigerick, 2007), preadolescence (Latner, Simmonds, Rosewall, & Stunkard, 2007; 
Powlishta et al., 1994), adolescence (Puhl & Latner, 2007), and adulthood (Hilbert, Rief, 
& Braehler, 2008; Klaczynski et al., 2004).  Weight stereotypes have been displayed by 
youth of Caucasian, African American, Hispanic, and Greek ethnicities (Greenleaf, 
Chambliss, Rhea, Morrow, & Martin, 2006; Koroni, Garagouni-Areou, Roussi-Vergou, 
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Zafiropoulou, & Piperkakis, 2009; Margulies et al., 2008), against Caucasian, Hispanic, 
African American, and Greek targets (Klaczynski et al., 2009; Koroni, et al., 2009; 
Margulies et al., 2008) and by people of all weights and body types (Counts, Jones, 
Frame, & Jarvie, 1986; Cramer & Steinwert, 1998; Holub, 2008).  Weight stereotypes 
have been documented across domains in peer interactions, education, and family settings 
(see Puhl & Latner, 2007, for a review). 
There has not been extensive research on weight stereotypes during early 
childhood (i.e., between 3 and 6 years of age). However, Richardson (1970) tested 5- to 
12-year-olds with a ranking procedure using targets that differed by one characteristic 
(e.g., no physical handicap, in a wheelchair, with a leg brace, missing a hand, with a 
facial disfigurement, or overweight), and found that on average, the overweight target 
was least liked across all ages.  Similarly, on a task that required children to use a 
selection of targets (e.g., no obvious disfigurement, the opposite sex, wearing glasses, in 
a wheelchair, facially disfigured, and overweight) to answer an open-ended task (“…Tell 
me all about this kid.”), free choice task (“…Which ones are nice- do nice things/bad- do 
bad things?”), and forced-choice task (“…Point to the one you like best.”), Sigelman et 
al. (1986) found that 4- to 8-year-olds’ positivity towards overweight targets decreased 
and negativity towards overweight targets increased with age.   
Musher-Eizenman et al. (2004) presented 4- to 6-year-old Caucasian children 
with three tasks to compare underweight, average, and overweight groups.  Children 
assigned six pairs of adjectives to a figure from each weight group.  Then, children were 
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presented with 18 figures (three of each weight group and each gender) and picked three 
that they would most like to play with and one as a best friend.  Finally, children were 
asked about their controllability beliefs associated with the overweight group (e.g., food, 
fault, exercise, and change).  Adjective ratings for overweight figures were significantly 
lower than those for both average weight and thin figures.  Participants selected the 
overweight figures as friends and best friends significantly less than the thin or average 
weight figures.  Participants attributed a low to moderate amount of control to the 
overweight figure.  Control attributions were significantly correlated with the adjective 
ratings for the overweight characters, but not with friendship choices. 
In a similar study, Margulies et al., (2008) tested 3- to 5-year-old African 
American children at Head Start to compare underweight, average weight, and 
overweight groups using adjective attribution, friendship selection, and attribution of 
control tasks.  Mean adjective ratings for the overweight figures were significantly lower 
than ratings of underweight, but not average weight figures.  Participants preferred 
average weight figures first for all activities and friendship questions.  Greater control 
was attributed to the overweight than the underweight figure, and controllability scores 
were negatively correlated with adjective ratings for overweight, but not underweight 
figures. 
Cramer and Steinwert (1998) examined 3- to 5-year-old’s perceptions of 
overweight individuals.  Children were presented with oral scenarios that depicted a nice 
and a mean character (e.g., “Jenny complimented Susan’s sand castle, but Susan called 
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Jenny’s castle ugly, and with that she kicked it over.”).  Children were asked, “Which one 
of these two girls is (name of character), the nice/mean one who (action)?”  They 
responded by pointing to a character from a selection of three drawings (thin, average, 
and overweight).  Overweight targets were chosen as mean more often than thin or 
average targets, whereas thin and average targets were chosen as nice more frequently 
than the overweight targets.  Although participants of all ages responded in this manner, 
it was not until 4 years of age that children verbalized that body size was the basis for 
their responses.  Stereotypes against overweight targets were evident across body types, 
but overweight children displayed stronger negativity toward the overweight targets than 
average weight or thin children.  
Another study by Penny and Haddock (2007a) assessed 5- to 10-year-old 
children’s perceptions of overweight individuals.  They presented participants with 12 
scenarios that depicted a character who exhibited high or low levels of intelligence, social 
ability, artistic ability, and athleticism (e.g., “Geoff and Ed play tennis.  Geoff is really 
good and wins all his games, but Ed does not win any games.”).  Then, participants chose 
a target among four identical pairs of characters (one of the pair was average, one was 
overweight) that looked most like each character from the story.  Of the several 
interactions that were found, the most relevant to the current study was in the social 
domain.  For 5- to 8-year-olds, scores for high and low social ability were significantly 
different such that participants were less likely to associate overweight children with high 
social ability.  In contrast, scores for high and low social ability were also significantly 
10 
 
different for 9- to 10-year-olds, but in the opposite direction, such that participants were 
more likely to associate overweight children with high social ability. 
Limitations of Previous Research 
The previous research on weight stereotyping has been limited, as it has not been 
motivated by what we know about how young children reason about the characteristics of 
others early in life.  Generally, the literature has focused solely on the negative stigma 
associated with being overweight.  This is informative because it provides information 
about children’s associations of ‘bad’ with overweight.  However, studies were unable to 
test for a positivity bias, a profile of personality attribution that may guide children’s 
reasoning about others (Boseovski, in press; Boseovski & Lee 2006; 2008; Boseovski, et 
al., 2009; Heyman, et al., 2003; Lockhart, et al., 2002).  Previous studies utilized guided 
follow-up questions that required one target to be chosen as mean or of low ability, and 
one target to be chosen as nice or of high ability (e.g., Cramer & Steinwert, 1998; Penny 
& Haddock, 2007a) or one target to be chosen as most liked or a best friend (e.g., 
Richardson, 1970; Margulies et al., 2008; Musher-Eizenman et al., 2004).  Thus, children 
were prevented from responding that all targets possessed these qualities.  Additionally, 
these studies were unable to determine whether personality or appearance was more 
salient for children’s social perceptions because they only provided participants with 
either trait or weight information while eliciting inferences in the other domain. 
Second, it is unclear if previous studies elicited traits (i.e., stable, internal qualities 
that enable people to summarize, justify, and predict other’s actions; Yuill, 1993) or 
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labels (i.e., situational descriptors of a person in a particular moment) in children’s 
responses.  This lack of distinction between labels and traits in previous studies makes it 
unclear if participants think the targets are mean for the moment (i.e., a label), or mean 
people in general (i.e., a trait attribution).  Since children’s conceptions of targets have 
only been examined at a single point in time (e.g., Cramer & Steinwert, 1998; Margulies 
et al., 2008; Penny & Haddock, 2007a; 2007b; Powlishta et al., 1994; Richardson, 1970; 
Sigelman et al., 1986), it remains unclear if children believe targets may exhibit traits 
strictly in the given situation, or if this trait is a more enduring quality of the person.  
Children use this information for trait and behavior predictions (e.g., “Will this person be 
mean again in the future?” and “Should I befriend this person?”).  
Third, previous studies presented participants with extreme scenarios about 
targets that were all positive or all negative (e.g., Cramer & Steinwert, 1998; Penny & 
Haddock, 2007a).  Given that young children are easily primed by valence (e.g., Heyman 
& Giles, 2004), these scenarios may have primed participants to think in a more 
evaluative manner than they would have without the biased information.  Thus, when 
presented with information about a target that was entirely the same valence, children 
may have thought or responded more categorically than they may have in a more realistic 
setting.  
Finally, previous studies required children to project their ideas about appearance 
and personality from oral scenarios onto visual images (e.g., Cramer & Steinwert, 1998; 
Margulies et al., 2008; Penny & Haddock, 2007a; 2007b; Powlishta et al., 1994).  This 
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procedure required substantial inferential leaps and may have seemed unrealistic to 
participants as they were typically presented with several identical characters differing 
only by weight (which may also have encouraged cross-weight stigmatization; see Penny 
& Haddock, 2007b).  
Current Study  
It is critically important to establish how children reason about others when 
provided with both weight and trait information together given that most weight 
stereotypes involve traits, and children often have both types of information about others 
when making social judgments in the real world.  Evidence across the literature provides 
mixed results regarding appearance and personality, specifically, which is more salient to 
children when forming impressions of others  (Diesendruck & haLevi, 2006; Gelman & 
Markman, 1986; Griffin & Langlois, 2006; Heyman, & Gelman, 2000; Latner & 
Stunkard, 2004).  Children as young as 3 years use trait similarities to make inductive 
inferences when pitted against superficial appearance similarities (Gelman & Markman, 
1986; Heyman & Gelman, 2000), yet children will also make personality attributions 
based solely on appearance cues (e.g., weight) as early as 3 years (Cramer & Steinwert, 
1998).   
The current study assessed which of these domains, appearance or personality, are 
more salient in the processing of weight and agreeability information in 3- to 6-year-old 
children.  Participants were presented with scenarios about overweight and average 
weight characters that also described the character’s personality (e.g., nice or mean), and 
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then asked to recall the information.  Agreeableness was selected for the current study 
because social behavior is stressed in school settings (Stipek & Daniels, 1990) and this 
dimension is primary for children’s trait reasoning about others (Heyman et al., 2003). 
The scenario format used was inspired by Heyman et al. (2003), which examined 
children’s reasoning about ability and outcomes.  Behavior descriptions were chosen 
from numerical rankings provided by Levy and Dweck (1999) to ensure the ‘good’ and 
‘bad’ examples of each trait are similar in degree.  Participants were presented with 
scenarios that included multiple pieces of target information (e.g., name, weight, age, 
filler information, agreeability, example of agreeability, shirt color) to increase the task’s 
cognitive load and induce the participant’s use of weight- or trait-related schemas 
(Stangor & McMillan, 1992).  Specifically, the higher the cognitive load, or mental 
demands of the task, the less accurate the child’s recall of the information should have 
been.  Therefore, participants were expected to revert to their ideas, or general mental 
representations of the characters, to answer questions when they could not remember 
provided information.  
Three types of questions were asked for the study’s dependent measures.  
Objective questions assessed participants’ recall of targets’ agreeability and weight 
information in the main task.  Predictive and essentialist questions were asked in the 
essentialism task.  Predictive questions assessed participants’ conceptions of agreeability 
over time (i.e., in the past and in the future).  Essentialist questions assessed participants’ 
inferences of meaningful information by treating weight as a natural kind or category (see 
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Gelman, Heyman, & Legare, 2007).  Children’s conceptions of weight were examined 
across several essentialist domains including contagiousness (i.e., the notion that persons 
or objects that come into contact with each other have non-visible, transferrable essences; 
Gelman, 2003), biological origins (i.e., beliefs about the genetic origins of weight), 
stability (i.e., beliefs about weight over time), and changeability (i.e., that weight can be 
altered).  Essentialist beliefs have been proposed to contribute to stereotyping (Gelman, 
2003).  Specifically for body weight, increased beliefs that overweight people may be 
more contagious, biologically different, permanently fixed, and unalterable may manifest 
as negative stereotypes of overweight people. 
Essentialist beliefs have been detected as young as 2 years of age (Gelman, 2003), 
yet these beliefs may not be coherent across dimensions (e.g., brain, blood, change) until 
about 9 years of age (Gelman et al., 2007).  However, Gelman et al. did not examine 
weight and found that the youngest participants in their sample (7-year-olds) displayed 
the most essentialist reasoning. Thus, body weight should be examined as an 
essentialized social category in preschool and early elementary aged children.   
The current study addressed previously mentioned limitations by using prediction 
questions to assess the extent of the child's attribution of the target over time to 
distinguish traits from labels.  Second, participants were provided with both matched 
(i.e., all positive or all negative) and mixed (i.e., both positive and negative) valence 
scenarios to avoid priming overly evaluative reasoning.  Third, the current study 
presented children with objective information in order to compare the amount (i.e., 
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weight, trait, or both types of information) and direction (i.e., more positive or more 
negative) that children may distort the provided information to fit with their ideas about 
appearance and personality.  Using this method, the current study was designed to 
determine which domain is more salient in children’s social reasoning, or if children’s 
reasoning is guided by a general positivity bias.  Fourth, by assessing children’s essences 
associated with weight across several domains, the current study determined the degree to 
which various essentialist beliefs were associated with weight, coherent across domains, 
and potentially related to recall of weight and trait information from target scenarios. 
Finally, no single study has previously examined the period between 3 and 6 years 
of age that encompasses rapid changes in the domains of cognitive flexibility (Zelazo, 
Frye, & Rapus, 1996), simple working memory (Carlson, Moses, & Breton, 2002; Davis 
& Pratt, 1995; Kaufman & Kaufman, 1983), and theory of mind (Taylor, 1988).  Thus, 
the current study examined this period by including measures of these domains to assess 
how other cognitive processes may contribute to weight stereotyping and personality 
reasoning, and how these cognitive and social abilities may be related to essentialist 
beliefs about weight.  
Cognitive flexibility was examined because it requires the ability to see an object 
in multiple ways (e.g., a red bunny card can be categorized by color as red or by shape as 
a bunny; Zelazo et al., 1996).  Thus, it may be relevant to understanding that although 
other people may be grouped into the same weight category and share salient properties, 
they may also be seen in different ways as members of other categories.  For example, 
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someone with cognitive flexibility can recognize that just because Bryan is overweight 
now, he may not have always been overweight, and could potentially become a member 
of another weight group (i.e., thin or average weight) in the future.  Cognitive flexibility 
was tested using the Dimensional Change Card Sort (DCCS) task (Zelazo et al., 1996).  
Working memory was examined because it is a system that allows one to 
temporarily hold information in mind while also processing that information (Baddeley, 
1986).  Thus, this may be relevant to keeping provided weight or trait information in 
mind while forming impressions of the targets.  For example, someone with working 
memory can remember that although Bryan is overweight (which is construed as 
negative), he also has other relevant social qualities (i.e., he is nice).  Simple working 
memory was tested using the auditory Backwards Digit Span (BDS) task (Carlson et al., 
2002) and the K-ABC Forward Digit Span (K-ABC) task Kaufman & Kaufman, 1983). 
Theory of mind was examined because it is the ability to attribute mental states 
(e.g., beliefs, intents, desires, pretending, knowledge) to oneself and others, and to 
understand that others have beliefs, desires, and intentions that could differ from one's 
own (Premack & Woodruff, 1978).  Thus, this may be relevant to understanding and 
predicting the behaviors of others.  For example, a person with theory of mind can use the 
actions of others to infer traits and estimate future behavior (i.e., Bryan shared his 
crayons with his classmates; thus, he may be nice and likely to do other nice things in the 
future).  Theory of Mind was tested using the Conceptual Perspective Taking (TOM) task 
(Taylor, 1988).  
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Given the aforementioned modifications and additions, several hypotheses were 
made.  It was predicted that overall, children’s recall of target scenario information would 
increase with age, however, children’s incorrect responses could be examined for biases 
for trait or weight information.  It was predicted that when given both appearance and 
personality information, personality would be more salient to children, and this salience 
would increase with age.  Alternatively, it is possible that positivity may trump both 
weight and trait information.  For essentialism, it was predicted that essentialist beliefs 
about weight would increase and become more coherent across domains with age.  For 
cognitive and social measures, performance was expected to improve with age, contribute 
to performance on the main task (i.e., increases in recall), and relate to decreases in 
weight stereotypes (i.e., decreases in weight essentialism).  
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CHAPTER II 
METHOD 
 
 
Participants 
 
A total of 81 children were tested.  There was one participant whose data were 
unusable due to an incomplete testing session.  Thus, data from 80 participants were 
included in the final analyses (52.5% female).  There were 20 participants at each of the 
following ages: 3 years (M = 41.75, SD = 3.88; 11 females), 4 years (M = 53.65, SD = 
2.72; 10 females), 5 years (M = 66.6, SD = 3.87; 12 females), and 6 years (M = 76, SD = 
6.94; 9 females).  The ethnic make-up of the sample included approximately 41% 
Caucasian, 36% African American, 10% Mixed, 3% Asian, and 1% Hispanic children 
(9% did not respond).  The economic make-up of the sample included annual household 
incomes of approximately 35% with $60,000 or above, 10% between $40,000 and 
$60,000, 12.5% between $20,000 and $40,000%, and 5% under $20,000 (37.5% did not 
respond).  Participants were recruited from local child-care centers or preschools, and 
from a database of children from Greensboro, North Carolina.  Testing took place at the 
participants’ child-care center or a University lab.  
Design 
The between-subjects variable was participant age.  The within-subjects variables 
included the weight of the target character (chubby or thin) and agreeability of the 
character (nice or mean).  Weight and agreeability were crossed to create four scenarios:  
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thin/nice, thin/mean, chubby/nice, and chubby/mean.  Tasks were presented in a fixed 
order: weight-training silhouettes, DCCS, target scenarios, essentialism, BDS, TOM, and 
K-ABC.  There was one exception to this order such that BDS was used during the 1 min 
delay between scenario presentation and follow-up questions for 5- to 6-year-olds in the 
target scenario task, instead of between the essentialism and TOM as for the 3- to 4-year-
olds. 
Procedure 
 Participants were tested individually in the university lab or in a quiet room of the 
participants’ child-care or preschool facility.  All characters were gender consistent with 
the child because maximum identification with the character was desired (see Heyman & 
Dweck, 1998).  The testing session ranged from 20 to 30 min.  Participants’ answers were 
recorded on score sheets by the experimenter and recorded via videotape when given 
parental video consent.  
Weight-Training Silhouettes.  This task was conducted to ensure that 
participants understood ‘chubby’ and ‘thin’, the primary weight terms used in this 
project.  First, participants were presented with pictures of two silhouettes that were 
accompanied by short descriptions ("This is a thin boy/girl.  He/she is not skinny or 
chubby.  He/she is in-between.  He/she is thin." and "This is a chubby boy/girl.  He/she 
weighs a lot. He/she is heavier than skinny and thin kids.  He/she is chubby.").  The thin 
silhouette was presented first because the chubby scenario used ‘thin kids’ as a reference 
point in its description such that chubby kids are “heavier than the thin and skinny kids”.  
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Then, knowledge questions were asked (“Can you point to chubby?”, and “Can you point 
to thin?”) in a random order.  If participants responded incorrectly (i.e., misidentified the 
chubby or thin silhouette), the task was repeated.  
Characters for the weight-training phase were depicted by silhouettes (8 ½ in x 11 
in) of a chubby and thin boy or girl adapted from Holub and Shafique (in prep; see 
Appendix A).  Color pictures of a chubby boy or girl were used to accompany 
essentialism questions (see Figure C1).  Computer generated images were selected to 
ensure the photos were matched for attractiveness and appearance.  Thin characters 
represented “average” and chubby characters represented “obese” weight groups from the 
Contour Drawing Rating Scale (Thompson & Gray, 1995). 
DCCS (Zelazo et al., 1996).  This is a rule use task that measured cognitive 
flexibility, or the ability to think about one object in multiple ways.  Prior to each game, 
the experimenter attached target cards to each of the sorting bins.  Target cards were a 
blue boat and a red bunny, and the sorting cards were blue bunnies and red boats.  
Participants were instructed to sort according to one dimension (e.g., shape) for five pre-
switch trials.  Instructions were repeated prior to each trial.  Then, using the same cards 
and bins, participants were instructed to sort by the other dimension (e.g., color).  The 
order of sorting dimension and position of the target cards were counterbalanced across 
participants.  Materials for this task included 14 laminated cards (5 in x 3.5 in) and two 
plastic bins. 
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Target Scenarios.  This task investigated the central question of this project: how 
children’s impressions of others (i.e., decisions that someone is nice or mean) are 
influenced by the target person’s weight.  Participants were presented with four scenarios, 
one in each possible combination of weight and agreeability.  This is a nice target 
scenario for a male participant: “I know a boy named Larry and he’s at preschool/school.  
Larry is a chubby/thin boy who is the same age as you.  Larry has art class right now and 
they are drawing pictures with crayons.  Larry is nice - he shares his crayons with his 
classmates.  Larry likes to color pictures, and he’s drawing some trees.  Larry is wearing 
a blue shirt today.”  See Appendix B for a full list of scenarios. 
Then, there was a 1 min delay between scenario presentation and follow-up 
questions that was determined through piloting.  During this delay, participants engaged 
in a backward number task that varied for each age group.  Three- to 4-year-olds 
completed a backward counting task (adapted from Smyth & Pelky, 1992).  Five- to 6-
year-olds completed the backward digit span task (Carlson et al., 2002; Davis & Pratt, 
1995).  Both tasks were designed to tax participants’ memory by requiring them to recite 
a set of numbers; however, a more simplified task was used for the 3- to 4-year-olds 
because it is not until about 5 years of age that children generally pass the first set of 2 
digit numbers in the backwards digit span (Carlson et al., 2002).  The distracter task 
between each target presentation consisted of character cards (e.g., Mickey Mouse, Elmo, 
etc.) and four questions about each card (“Do you know who this is?”, “What does (the 
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character) like to do?”, “Who are some of (the character’s friends?”, and “How do you 
know (the character)?”).  
After each scenario, participants were asked a series of questions.  Follow-up 
questions included participants’ general impression of the target first (“What kind of 
girl/boy is (the target)?”), the target’s weight and agreeability presented in a random 
order with the constraint that “not chubby or thin” and “not nice or mean” were always 
presented as the final option (“Is she/he chubby, thin, or not chubby or thin?” and “Is 
she/he nice, mean, or not nice or mean?”), and a friendship question presented last (“Do 
you want to be friends with (the target)?”).  
Essentialism Questions.  This task investigated the secondary question of the 
project: what is the ‘essence’ or belief that characteristics associated with the chubby 
weight group are relatively stable, unchanging, and biologically based (Gelman, et al., 
2007).  Participants were presented with a short introduction about a gender-consistent 
character with an accompanying picture: “Remember that we talked about some chubby 
kids in the stories you just heard? Well, this is Ben/Brittany, a different chubby boy/girl 
who is just your age, and I want to ask you some questions about him/her.”  Essentialism 
questions were divided into four domains: contagion (“If you wanted to wear a hat, 
would you try on Ben/Brittany’s hat?”), stability (“Now think of Ben/Brittany a long time 
from now in the future when he/she will be a grown up.  Will he/she be chubby, thin, or 
not chubby or thin?”), biological origins (“A girl/boy named Anna/Adam is not chubby.   
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Do you think that Ben’s/Brittany’s blood is the same as Anna’s/Adam’s blood?”), and 
changeability (“Could Ben/Brittany stop being chubby?”).  See Appendix C for a full list. 
Domain order and questions within each domain were pre-randomized into two 
orders.  Each random order was counterbalanced across participants.  Response options 
within each question (e.g., “nice, mean, or not nice or mean” with the constraint that “not 
nice or mean” was always presented as the final option) were also pre-randomized.  
Materials included a gender-neutral child’s ball cap and color pictures of overweight 
target characters (see Appendix C1). 
 BDS (Carlson et al., 2002; Davis & Pratt, 1995).  This task measured working 
memory, defined as a system that holds information in mind temporarily while 
simultaneously processing other information (Baddeley, 1986).  Participants were told 
about “a silly bunny” named Fluffy who likes to say and do things backwards.  After 
participants heard a list of numbers, they were asked to repeat the numbers in backwards 
order.  They heard three sets of numbers in four different lengths (e.g., 2 digits, 3 digits, 4 
digits, 5 digits).  Materials included a bunny puppet. 
TOM (Taylor, 1988).  This task measured the ability to distinguish between what 
one knows and what one sees, which is one aspect of theory of mind.  The experimenter 
showed and described a picture of an elephant and a giraffe named George who was 
sitting.  Then, the picture was covered except for what could be seen through a small, 
square cutout.  Parts of the picture were visible through the window in a set order: blank 
space, an indistinguishable part of the giraffe, indistinguishable parts of both the giraffe 
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and the elephant, and a distinguishable part of the giraffe.  After the picture was covered, 
the experimenter brought out a puppet and asked the participant if the puppet knew the 
provided information (e.g., “Does Leo know there is an elephant in this picture?” and  
“Does Leo know there is a giraffe in this picture?”).  For the last two trials, participants 
were asked additional questions (e.g., “Does Leo know the giraffe is sitting?”, “Does Leo 
know the giraffe’s name?”, and “Does Leo know the elephant’s name?”).  Materials 
included a laminated line drawing of an elephant and a giraffe, four laminated pages with 
a square cutout, and a lion puppet. 
K-ABC (Kaufman & Kaufman, 1983).  This task measured short-term memory 
(or simple working memory, see Garon, Bryson, & Smith, 2008), defined as the amount 
of information able to be actively kept in mind.  Participants were instructed to repeat 
digits exactly as they heard the experimenter say them when it was the child’s turn 
(indicated by the experimenter pointing to the child).  Digits were presented at a rate of 
one digit per second from a string of 2 single digit numbers to a string of 9 single digit 
numbers with 3 exemplars of each length.  Three incorrect items in a row (including the 
first two items that were used as training items) was used as the stopping criterion. 
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CHAPTER III 
RESULTS 
 
 
Target Scenarios  
 Children’s responses on target scenarios were examined to determine the overall 
recall of trait and weight information, the salience of appearance versus personality, 
contributions to recall from cognitive and social variables, and how these associations 
change with age. 
Weight-training silhouettes. Participants were trained on weight terms until they 
correctly identified the ‘thin’ and ‘chubby’ targets with a maximum of three attempts.  
Older children (M = 1.15, SD = .362) correctly identified the targets in fewer attempts 
than younger children (M = 1.4, SD = .545), F(1, 78) = 5.838, p = .018, ηp2 = .07. 
Does children’s recall change with age?  As hypothesized, older children 
recalled more of both weight and trait information from the target scenarios (M = 2.2, SD 
= 1.14, range: 0-4) than younger children (M = .95, SD = .846, range: 0-4), F(1, 78) = 
31.130, p < .001, ηp2 = .285. 
Do children display biases for weight or trait information?  Children’s incorrect 
responses were examined for patterns (i.e., a positivity bias or a negativity bias for weight 
or trait information).  Trait positivity bias was examined in the two scenarios about mean 
targets (i.e., two ‘mean’ responses indicated recall, score = 0; one ‘nice’ response  
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indicated trait positivity for both scenarios, score = 2).  Weight negativity bias was 
examined in the two scenarios about thin targets (i.e., two ‘thin’ responses indicated 
recall, score = 0; one ‘thin’ response indicated weight negativity for one scenario, score = 
1; two ‘chubby’ responses indicated weight negativity for both scenarios, score = 2).  
Four variables were created to examine these biases: trait positivity, weight positivity, 
trait negativity, and weight negativity (range: 0-2, higher scores indicate more biased 
responses). 
A two-way 4 (bias: trait positivity, weight positivity, trait negativity, and weight 
negativity) x 2 (age: 3- to 4-year-olds or 5- to 6-year-olds) repeated measures ANOVA 
revealed a significant main effect of bias, F(3, 76) = 3.767, p = .011, ηp2 = .151, but was 
qualified by a marginally significant interaction with the between subjects variable age, 
F(3, 76) = 2.273, p = .081, ηp2 = .076.  Older children were less likely than younger 
children to label a nice target as ‘mean’ (t = 1.94, p = .055); however, age groups did not 
significantly differ for trait positivity (t = 1.14, p = .386), weight positivity (t = -1.34, p = 
.577), or weight negativity (t = 1.54, p = .126; see Figure 1).  Thus, as predicted, children 
were more accurate at labeling positive traits with increasing age as evident by a decrease 
in biased responses about agreeability information in 5- to 6-year-olds compared to 3- to 
4-year-olds. 
 
 
 
 
 
27 
 
Figure 1  
 
Mean Response Patterns for Weight and Trait Information by Age and Type of Bias  
  
     *p = .05.  
 
Do cognitive or social variables predict recall?  Consistent with the scoring 
procedures of Zelazo, Müller, Frye, and Marcovitch (2003) for the DCCS, participants 
must have correctly sorted all five cards on the pre-switch trials (e.g., if color, all cards 
must match with the target card’s color) and also correctly sorted at least 4 out of 5 of the 
post-switch trials (e.g., if shape, 4 of the 5 cards must match with the target card’s shape) 
to pass (fail = 0, pass = 1, range: 0-1).  
Consistent with Carlson et al. (2002) for the BDS, participants were scored as 
correct if they repeated the provided numbers in the correct order.  Each set of numbers 
was scored, and participants were credited for the longest number length correctly 
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repeated in backwards order (fail/only 2 digits = 1, 3 digits = 2, 4 digits = 3, 5 digits = 4, 
range: 1-4). 
Consistent with Taylor's (1988) scoring scheme for TOM, participants’ responses 
were sorted into five categories: yes bias (i.e., consistently answered “yes”), no bias (i.e., 
consistently answered “no”), Level I theory of mind (i.e., equating seeing with knowing), 
Level II theory of mind (i.e., the ability to recognize the different perspectives of the 
child versus the puppet), and no pattern (i.e., responses that did not fall into any other 
category and appeared to be random).  To be classified as Level II theory of mind, 
participants must have answered “no” to every question except for a “yes” that the puppet 
knew there was a giraffe in the picture in the final trial (random = 0, yes bias = 1, no bias 
= 2, level I = 3, level II = 4, range: 0-4).   
Consistent with the scoring procedures of Kaufman and Kaufman (1983) for the 
K-ABC, each sequence was scored as correct (1 point) or incorrect (0 points), depending 
whether the child repeated the sequence correctly.  The raw score was then computed as 
the difference between the ceiling item (number of last sequence administered) and total 
errors (range: 0-22). 
A multiple regression analysis was used to predict recall from performance on 
cognitive and social measures (e.g., DCCS, BDS, TOM, and K-ABC).  It was 
hypothesized that all cognitive and social variables would be related to recall, therefore, 
predictors were simultaneously entered.  In the four variable model, only DCCS (t = 
3.371, p = .001) and BDS (t = 2.728, p = .008) were significant predictors (p < .05) of 
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recall, but TOM (t = .941, p = .350) and K-ABC (t = .988, p = .327) were not significant 
predictors.  Thus, only cognitive flexibility and working memory predict a significant, 
unique amount of variance in recall, and the two predictor model explains 50.3% of the 
variance in recall, F(2, 77) = 39.012, p < .001, R2 = .503.1  
Essentialism  
Children’s responses on the essentialism task were examined to determine if 
participants make non-obvious inferences by treating weight as a category, if these 
inferences are consistent across domains of essentialism, and how these associations 
change with age. 
Does essentialist reasoning about weight change with age?  Participants’ 
responses were individually, dichotomously scored (not essentialist = 0, essentialist = 1, 
range: 0-1), and then scores were summed for each essentialist domain (contagion 1 
range: 0-1, contagion 2 range: 0-1, stability range: 0-4, biological range: 0-2, and change 
range 0-6).  A composite variable for essentialism was created by combining all domains 
of essentialism (range: 0-14, higher scores indicated more weight essentialism).  As 
hypothesized, older children were more likely than younger children to report that weight 
was contagious, stable, biologically rooted, and unchangeable, F(1, 78) = 16.512, p < 
.001, ηp2 = .177 (means displayed in Table 1).  No gender, ethnicity, or socioeconomic 
status differences were found.  
                                                        
1 Given that 12 participants did not have K-ABC data, using all four factors resulted in a 
smaller sample and did not improve the model, F(4, 63) = 15.756, p < .001, R2 = .500. 
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Table 1 
 
Children’s Mean Performance on Essentialism Measures by Age  
 
    3- to 4-year-olds  5- to 6-year-olds 
Measure n M (SD) Range  n M (SD) Range 
Contagion 1 40 .05 (.221) 0-1  40 .4 (.496) 0-1 
Contagion 2 40 .15 (.362) 0-1  40 .425 (.501) 0-1 
Stability 40 2.125 (.883) 0-4  40 2.35 (1.03) 0-4 
Biological 40 1.15 (.483) 0-2  40 1.375 (.705) 0-2 
Change 39 2.744 (2.47) 0-6  40 4.15 (2.08) 0-6 
Total  39 6.15 (2.896) 0-14  40 8.7 (2.483) 0-14 
 
Is essentialist reasoning about weight coherent across domains?  Separate 
Pearson correlations for 3- to 4-year-olds and 5- to 6-year-olds indicated that essentialism 
about weight was not consistent across domains.  For 3- and 4-year-olds, the greater the 
essentialism in contagion 1, stability, or change domains, the greater the total 
essentialism (r’s = .389 - .921, p’s = .000 - .013).  However, biological essentialism and 
contagion 2 were not significant (r’s = .076-.148, p’s = .361-.642; see Table 2).   
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Table 2 
 
Summary of Correlations for 3- to 4-year-olds’ Essentialist Reasoning about Weight 
 
Measure 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1. Contagion 1 - .225 .099 -.072 .311* .389* 
2. Contagion 2 .225 - .020 -.279* -.043 .076 
3. Stability .099 .020 - .135 .141 .484** 
4. Biological -.072 -.279* .135 - -.032 .148 
5. Change .311* -.043 .141 -.032 - .921** 
6. Total .389* .076 .484** .148 .921** - 
**p < .05; *p < .10. 
 
 
Five- to 6-year-olds showed similar positive correlations across all domains (r’s = 
.287 - .822, p’s = .000 - .072) except for biological essentialism (r = .11, p = .5; see Table 
3).  Thus, essentialism was not coherent across all domains as predicted, and the data 
were inconclusive regarding coherence across essentialist domains with age. 
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Table 3 
 
Summary of Correlations for 5- to 6-year-olds’ Essentialist Reasoning about Weight 
 
Measure 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1. Contagion 1 - .434** -.131 .073 .040 .287* 
2. Contagion 2 .434** - .102 -.027 .011 .332** 
3. Stability -.131 .102 - -.186 .023 .374** 
4. Biological .073 -.027 -.186 - -.127 .110 
5. Change .040 .011 .023 -.127 - .822** 
6. Total .287* .332** .374** .110 .822** - 
**p < .05; *p < .10. 
 
Cognitive and Social Measures  
Children’s performance on cognitive and social measures was examined to 
determine how these abilities may contribute to recall of scenario information, essentialist 
reasoning about weight, and how these abilities change with age. 
Does performance on cognitive and social measures change with age?  Four 
separate one-way ANOVAs that examined age differences between 3- to 4-year-olds and 
5- to 6-year-olds in performance on cognitive and social measures revealed that all scores 
significantly increased with age: DCCS, F(1, 78) = 49.935, p < .001, ηp2 = .390; TOM, 
F(1, 78) =  11.982, p = .001, ηp2 = .133; BDS, F(1, 78) = 51.675, p < .001, ηp2 = .398; 
and K-ABC, F(1, 66) = 48.692, p < .001, ηp2 = .425 (see Table 4).  For this analysis, total 
performance scores on the DCCS were used instead of categorical pass/fail scores (range: 
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0-10, higher scores indicated better performance).  As predicted, older children were 
better at perceiving an item in multiple ways, recognizing that others have beliefs that 
may differ from one’s own, and holding information in mind while also processing or 
reporting back that information.  No gender, ethnicity, or socioeconomic status 
differences were found across analyses for cognitive or social measures.  
 
Table 4 
 
Children’s Mean Performance on the Cognitive and Social Measures by Age  
 
    3- to 4-year-olds  5- to 6-year-olds 
Measure n M (SD) Range  n M (SD) Range 
DCCS 40 .175 (.385) 0-1  40 .675 (.474) 0-1 
TOM 40 .1 (.441) 0-2  40 .575 (.747) 0-2 
BDS 40 .15 (.427) 0-4  40 1.525 (1.132) 0-4 
K-ABC 33 5.212 (2.902) 0-22  35 9.714 (2.408) 0-22 
  
Is performance on cognitive or social measures related to recall on the target 
scenarios?  For 3- to 4-year-olds, recall was positively correlated with the DCCS (r = 
.343, p = .03) and the K-ABC (r = .361, p = .039) such that the more young children 
exhibited cognitive flexibility and better memory on the cognitive tasks, the higher the 
recall on target scenarios.  For 5- to 6-year-olds, recall was positively correlated with the 
DCCS (r = .552, p < .001) and BDS (r = .514, p = .001) such that the more cognitive 
flexibility and working memory older children exhibited on the cognitive tasks, the 
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higher the recall on target scenarios.  Recall was only marginally correlated with BDS (r 
= .306, p = .055) and TOM (r = .288, p = .071) for younger children, and not significantly 
correlated with K-ABC (r = .240, p = .165) or TOM (r = .133, p = .414) for older 
children.  Thus, although all cognitive and social measures were expected to relate to 
recall, only cognitive flexibly was consistent across age. 
Is performance on cognitive and social tasks related to essentialist reasoning 
about weight?  Pearson correlations for 5- to 6-year-olds confirmed that with increasing 
cognitive flexibility, older children endorsed less weight stability (r = -.365, p = .007).  
Additionally, the greater the ability to hold information in mind while concurrently 
manipulating that information, older children endorsed less weight stability with marginal 
statistical significance (r = -.295, p = .064).  However, K-ABC (r = .140, p = .421) and 
TOM (r = .054, p = .741) were not significantly related to essentialist weight reasoning. 
There were no significant correlations for younger children (r’s = -.172 - .029, p’s = .287 
- .910).  Thus, although each cognitive and social measure was predicted to relate to 
weight essentialism, only cognitive flexibility was significant. 
 
35 
 
CHAPTER IV 
DISCUSSION 
 
 
 The present study examined 3- to 6-year-old children’s social reasoning when 
provided with physical appearance and personality information.  Our central aim was to 
document how children’s impressions of others (i.e., decisions that someone is nice or 
mean) are influenced by the target person’s weight using participant’s responses on the 
target scenarios.  Overall, younger children recalled approximately 1 of the 4 scenarios, 
and older children recalled approximately two scenarios.  However, approximately half 
of children in both age groups responded with at least one response relevant to each bias 
(i.e., trait positivity, weight positivity, trait negativity, and weight negativity).  Decreased 
biased trait responses for 5- to 6-year-olds suggest that with age, children were more 
accurate in labeling positive traits.  This finding is consistent with previous personality 
reasoning research that found with age, children perceived traits to be more meaningful 
than appearance cues in tasks that pitted personality against appearance (e.g., 
Diesendruck & haLevi, 2006; Gelman & Markman, 1986; Heyman, & Gelman, 2000).  
This has implications for previous studies of weight stereotyping that provided 
information about one domain (i.e., weight or trait) and elicited responses in the other 
domain, namely, if provided with both types of information, children may pay more 
attention to trait information instead of weight.  
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Consistent with previous personality attribution research (e.g., Boseovski & Lee 
2006; 2008; Boseovski, in press), the current study found that with increasing age, 
children were more reluctant to label targets as ‘mean’.  This finding supports the 
presence of a trait positivity bias in the early elementary years, and extends our 
understanding of this bias to include children’s reasoning about personality when 
competing with appearance information (i.e., weight).  Additionally, an inspection of 
obtained values suggests that older children were more positive and less negative than 
younger children for 3 of the 4 examined biases.  Further research is needed to determine 
if this trend could be evidence of an overarching positivity bias for both weight and trait 
information that increases with age. 
 Although the trait positivity bias finding is at odds with much of the weight 
stereotyping literature that suggests young children are becoming increasingly negative 
during early childhood, perhaps it can be reconciled by children’s essentialist beliefs 
about weight.  Older children believed that weight was more contagious, stable, 
biologically based, and less likely to be changed.  Essentialized thought likely contributes 
to stereotypes (Gelman, 2003), namely, weight stereotypes that have been documented to 
increase between 5 and 6 years of age (e.g., Penny & Haddock, 2007b; Richardson, 1970; 
Sigelman et al., 1986).  Thus, although older children were less likely to label chubby and 
thin targets as ‘mean’, perhaps it is their essentialist beliefs about weight that drive 
children’s actual behaviors towards chubby peers that have been well documented in 
previous literature (e.g., less likely to befriend, and less likely to choose as a playmate or 
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project partner; Cramer & Steinwert, 1998; Margulies et al., 2004; Musher-Eizenman et 
al., 2008).   
This was the first study of its kind to examine essentialist beliefs about weight in 
a comprehensive manner using a pre-school and early elementary sample.  As expected, 
essentialism increased with age, however, essentialist beliefs were not consistent across 
all domains for either age group.  This is consistent with Gelman et al. (2007), who found 
that essentialist reasoning was not coherent across essentialist domains until about 9 years 
of age.  However, Gelman and colleagues examined essentialist reasoning about a 
different set of characteristics (e.g., traits and talents such as ‘curious’ and ‘good at 
music’; and novel descriptors such as ‘vooper’ and ‘banana-hater’) that pertained mostly 
to personality.  Unlike personality, body weight is considered a hybrid trait that combines 
biological and psychological components (Lockhart et al., 2002) and is perpetually 
visible.  Nonetheless, it seems that the development of children’s weight-related 
essentialist thought parallels that of previously examined personality characteristics. 
Regarding social and cognitive measures, cognitive flexibility was the only 
consistent, significant finding in relation to recall and essentialist reasoning.  DCCS 
scores were associated with recall for both age groups, and related to weight essentialism 
for older children (i.e., 5- to 6-year-olds endorsed more weight malleability with 
increasing cognitive flexibility).  Thus, the ability to perceive a target as a member of 
multiple categories (i.e., by weight and trait) contributes to accurate recall of both the 
target’s weight and trait information.  Then, as cognitive flexibility increases with age, 
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perhaps children are able to extend their perceptions of a target beyond its current weight 
group to include potential membership in multiple weight groups, namely, a thin baby or 
a thin adult.  This is consistent with both the cognitive developmental literature (i.e., the 
progression from simple to more complex categorizations or higher-order rule use; Blaye 
& Jacques, 2009; Zelazo & Frye, 1998) and the stereotyping literature (i.e., increases in 
flexibility, or the belief that people from different categories can possess similar traits, 
were also associated with decreases in explicit stereotypes; Banse et al., 2010; Powlishta 
et al., 1994; Trautner et al., 2005).  There was also a trend that working memory (as 
measured by BDS or K-ABC) may contribute to essentialist beliefs and weight reasoning 
in a manner comparable to cognitive flexibility, but further research is needed to clarify 
this finding.  
Limitations  
 While the current study provided evidence about children’s weight-related 
reasoning including contributions from essentialist beliefs, cognitive and social abilities, 
there are improvements that must be addressed in future studies.  Conceptions of weight 
could not be examined over time within the same person as the child develops because 
the current study was cross-sectional.  Thus, it would be informative for future research 
to examine patterns of weight reasoning longitudinally to document the development of 
weight reasoning within the same individual over time and experience for further support 
of causal implications between essentialist beliefs, cognitive and social abilities, and 
weight stereotypes. 
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Given that this method and procedure were created uniquely for this study, further 
adjustments may be needed.  For example, a different delay length for each age group 
may be appropriate to prevent younger participants from forgetting much of the provided 
information and to preclude older participants from remembering much of the provided 
information.  Similarly, there was nearly a floor effect and little variability on cognitive 
and social measures for 3- to 4-year-olds, which may have attenuated a potential relation 
between cognitive and social abilities and beliefs about weight for this age group.  
Perhaps sensitive measures of cognitive and social abilities more appropriate for a 
younger sample (i.e., only 3 to 4 years of age) are needed.  
The current study used computer-generated pictures to ensure the characters’ 
weight and attractiveness were consistent across targets.  Actual pictures of children may 
have been more realistic for participants.  However, previous studies have used hand-
drawn, non-realistic looking pictures (e.g., Penny & Haddock, 2007a) or videos of actual 
children (e.g., Bell & Morgan, 2000) and obtained similar findings regarding negative 
weight-related beliefs.   
Given that optimal identification with the characters was desired (see Heyman & 
Dweck, 1998), the mixed results regarding cross-gender weight stigmatization (see Puhl 
& Latner, 2007), and evidence that early childhood friendships are often formed among 
same gender peers (Feiring & Lewis, 1991), the current study provided participants with 
gender consistent targets.  Thus, we were unable to examine children’s social reasoning 
across genders.  
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Finally, an immediate goal is to increase the sample size.  Increasing the sample 
size increases the power of a study to detect smaller effects.  Thus, some of the marginal 
effects and trends may have become significant if more children were tested.  
Correlations would also be more stable if a larger sample was used.   
Strengths 
Our method was informed by both the stereotyping literature and the early 
personality reasoning literature.  Using knowledge from both research areas, we were 
able to examine weight stereotypes in a more indirect, less restrictive manner that 
allowed children to respond in known patterns of early personality reasoning (i.e., 
positivity and negativity biases).  We were also able to examine how children reason 
about others when provided with both trait and weight information instead of providing 
one type of information and eliciting inferences about the other, thereby increasing its 
similarity to children’s daily peer interactions.  Additionally, the current study included 
measures of essentialist beliefs about weight, cognitive and social abilities.  Thus, in 
addition to documenting children’s attitudes about targets, we were able to explain why 
children exhibited particular beliefs using performance from measures of concurrently 
developing beliefs and abilities. 
Children’s conceptions of weight can be examined using various stimuli and 
terminology.  Visual images were not provided to participants in the target scenarios.  
This was preferred to providing images, which would have likely made appearance more 
salient than personality, thereby complicating our examination of weight or trait biases.  
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Also, the current study utilized ‘thin’ to represent average weight, and ‘chubby’ to 
represent overweight.  These terms were favored instead of terms such as ‘normal 
weight’ (which implies it is the normative weight, and any other would be abnormal) and 
‘fat’ (which invokes unrelated emotions and extreme dislike, Wadden & Didie, 2005). 
Future Directions 
Given that agreeability is primary in children’s conceptions of others (Heyman et 
al., 2007), the only personality factor examined in the current study was nice/mean.  
Similarly, given mixed findings regarding children’s conceptions of underweight targets, 
the current study only examined children’s conceptions of average weight and 
overweight groups.  Future research should examine children’s social reasoning about 
weight and personality using other traits (e.g., intelligence) and appearance cues (e.g., 
underweight). 
Children’s conceptions of weight should also be examined using the names of 
actual classmates they are familiar with from their daycare or school or by observing 
children’s interactions with peers from different weight groups.  This would improve our 
understanding of how children’s ideas about thin and chubby children map onto their 
actual beliefs and behaviors (i.e., friendship and playmate choices) with others in these 
weight groups.  Alternatively, this could also be examined using social network mapping 
(e.g., Strauss & Pollack, 2003) or playtime observations in conjunction with assessing 
children’s weight-related beliefs.  Given that youth report the most common sources of 
weight-related teasing at school are their friends (Puhl, Luedicke, & Heuer, in press), and 
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overweight youth are more likely to be isolated or peripheral to social networks (Strauss 
& Pollack, 2003), it would be interesting to examine the relation, if any, between more 
implicit beliefs and explicit manifestations of weight-related attitudes.  
Children’s essentialist beliefs should also be considered in developing 
intervention programs to reduce negative weight stereotypes.  Previous studies have 
established that control beliefs contribute to weight stereotypes (e.g., Bell & Morgan, 
2000; Crandall, 1994; Margulies et al., 2008; Musher-Eizenman, et al., 2004; Sigelman & 
Begley, 1987; Tiggemann & Anesbury, 2000), and some interventions have attempted to 
reduce control beliefs by providing medical explanations for obesity (e.g., Anesbury & 
Tiggeman, 2000; Bell & Morgan, 2000).  Although these interventions reduced 
controllability beliefs that children associated with being overweight, they were 
unsuccessful in altering behavior.   
Perhaps a more comprehensive intervention that provides information about 
contagion and weight stability in addition to previously addressed biological (i.e., 
possible medical condition, metabolism, genetic predisposition; Bell & Morgan, 2000) 
and controllability components (i.e., diet and exercise do not solely control weight; 
Anesbury & Tiggemann, 2000), could be more effective in altering children’s stereotypes 
and discrimination of individuals based on weight.  Contagion messages could emphasize 
the lack of transfer between obese and non-obese individuals by teaching children that 
one cannot ‘catch’ obesity or any obesity-related illness by being friends or spending 
time with an overweight person.  Stability messages could emphasize the lasting nature of 
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an obese classification that is attributable to a myriad of factors outside of the 
individual’s control by communicating that people who are overweight now will likely 
always be overweight given the documented lack of long-term success with dieting and 
weight loss (see Puhl & Heuer, 2010). 
 The present research adds to the growing fields of personality reasoning and 
stereotype formation in young children.  Specifically, our findings draw attention to the 
increasing importance of traits in children’s social reasoning and the potential salience of 
traits when pitted against weight.  Evidence from the current study emphasizes the need 
for a comprehensive examination of concurrently developing abilities to understand how 
children form impressions of others.  However, additional research is needed to replicate 
unique findings, clarify marginal trends, advance the investigation of how weight 
stereotypes influence behaviors, create and evaluate intervention programs to reduce 
negative weight stereotypes.   
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APPENDIX A 
 
VISUAL STIMULI USED IN WEIGHT-TRAINING SILHOUETTES TASK  
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APPENDIX B 
 
TARGET SCENARIOS 
 
 
1. I know a boy/girl named Larry/Lisa and he’s/she’s at pre/school. Larry/Lisa is a 
CHUBBY/THIN boy/girl who is the same age as you. Larry/Lisa has art class right now 
and they are drawing pictures with crayons. Larry/Lisa is nice – he/she shares his/her 
crayons with his/her classmates.  Larry/Lisa likes to color pictures, and he’s/she’s 
drawing some trees. Larry/Lisa is wearing a blue shirt today.  
 
2. I know a boy/girl named Mark/Mary and he’s at pre/school. Mark/Mary is a 
CHUBBY/THIN boy/girl who is the same age as you. Mark/Mary has writing class right 
now and they are making letters with pencil and paper. Mark/Mary is mean – he/she 
won’t clean up the papers his/her classmate dropped. Mark/Mary likes to make letters, 
and he’s/she’s making m’s and t’s. Mark/Mary is wearing a white shirt today.  
 
3. I know a boy/girl named Eric/Elizabeth and he’s/she’s at pre/school. Eric/Elizabeth is a 
CHUBBY/THIN boy/girl who is the same age as you. Eric/Elizabeth has playtime right 
now and they are playing with some toys. Eric/Elizabeth is nice – he/she shares his/her 
toys with his/her classmates. Eric/Elizabeth likes to play with toys, and he/she has some 
that are different colors. Eric/Elizabeth is wearing a red shirt today.  
 
4. I know a boy/girl named Andrew/Anne and he’s/she’s at pre/school. Andrew/Anne is a 
CHUBBY/THIN boy/girl who is the same age as you. Andrew/Anne has math class right 
now and they are writing numbers with pencil and paper. Andrew/Anne is mean – he/she 
would not loan his/her extra pencil to his/her classmate who needed one. Andrew/Anne 
likes to count, and he’s/she’s counting blocks. Andrew/Anne is wearing a yellow shirt 
today. 
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APPENDIX C 
 
ESSENTIALISM QUESTIONS AND VISUALS 
 
 
Remember that we talked about some chubby kids in the stories you just heard? Well, 
this is BEN/BRITTANY, a different chubby girl/boy who is just your age, and I want to 
ask you some questions about him/her. 
 
Contagion 
“This is BEN/BRITTANY’s hat. She/he likes to wear this hat a lot- this is 
BEN/BRITTANY’s favorite hat.”  
1.   If you wanted to wear a hat, would you try on ____’s hat?  
2.   How much do you like this hat?  
 
Stability 
  Weight 
1.    Do you think that BEN/BRITTANY would be chubby if she/he grew up in a 
house  where no one else was chubby? 
2.    Now think of BEN/BRITTANY a long time ago in the past when she/he was 
a baby. Was she/he chubby/thin/not chubby or thin?  
3.    Why is BEN/BRITTANY chubby? Is it because of things that people around 
her/him did? 
4.    Now think of BEN/BRITTANY a long time from now in the future when 
she/he will be a grown-up. Will she/he be thin/chubby/not chubby or thin?  
Trait 
1.    Now think of BEN/BRITTANY a long time from now in the future when 
she/he will be a grown up. Will she/he be mean/nice/not nice or mean?  
2.    Now think of BEN/BRITTANY a long time ago in the past when she/he was 
a baby. Was she/he nice/mean/not mean or nice?  
 
Biological 
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1.     A girl/boy named Anna/Adam is NOT chubby. Do you think that 
BEN/BRITTANY’s blood is the same as Anna’s/Adam’s blood? 
2.    A girl/boy named Nelly/Nathan is NOT chubby. Do you think that  
                   BEN/BRITTANY’s brain is different from Nelly’s/Nathan’s brain?  
 
Change 
1.      Could BEN/BRITTANY stop being chubby? (If yes or maybe then ask next 
questions): 
1.    Could she/he stop being chubby if her/his doctor tried to stop her/him from 
being   
  chubby? 
2.    Could she/he stop being chubby if her/his family tried to stop her/him from 
being  
  chubby? 
3.    Could she/he stay being chubby if her/his teacher tried to help her/him to stay  
  chubby? 
4.    Could she/he stay being chubby if her/his friend tried to help her/him to stay 
chubby? 
5.    Would it be easy or hard to stop being chubby? 
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FIGURE C1 
 
Visual Stimuli used in Essentialism Task 
 
 
  
 
